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Abstract
Substantial attention has been paid in recent years to the risk of maturity mismatch in
emerging markets. Although this risk is microeconomic in nature, the evidence advanced thus far
has taken the form of macro correlations. We evaluate this mechanism empirically at the micro
level by using a database of over 3000 publicly traded ﬁrms from ﬁfteen emerging markets. We
measure the risk of short-term exposure by estimating, at the ﬁrm level, the eﬀect on investment
of the interaction of short-term exposure and aggregate capital ﬂows. This eﬀect is (statistically)
zero, contrary to the prediction of the maturity-mismatch hypothesis. This conclusion is robust
to using a variety of diﬀerent estimators, alternative measures of capital ﬂows, and controls for
devaluation eﬀects and access to international capital. We do ﬁnd evidence that short-term-
exposed ﬁrms pay higher ﬁnancing costs and liquidate assets at “ﬁre sale” prices, but not that
this reduction in net worth translates into a drop in investment.
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1I Introduction
The risk of “maturity mismatch” for emerging-market ﬁrms has received considerable attention in
recent years. Although business assets are (stereotypically) installed for the long term and therefore
illiquid, capital-market frictions and distortions may induce ﬁrms to issue debt with relatively short
maturity. Should aggregate credit conditions shift suddenly, these same ﬁrms, unable to renew
their debt, might have to curtail investment and perhaps liquidate. On the aggregate level, entire
economies may be at risk of an investment collapse in the event of a capital-account reversal.
Proponents of this view include Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Chang and Velasco (1999), who
argue that excessive reliance on short-term debt leaves emerging-market corporations vulnerable
to “ﬁnancial panic” as in the stylized model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
These discussions were largely inspired by the ﬁnancial crises that aﬀected East Asia and Latin
America in the 1990s. The idea took on particular poignancy in reference to the emerging markets
of Asia, where the corporate sector was highly leveraged leading up to the crisis, and where much
of this indebtedness was at the short term.
That such a scenario is logically possible is by now beyond doubt. That such a mechanism is
of quantitative importance, however, remains an empirical question. Unfortunately, the “macro”
observation that crises occur with greater frequency in economies that have more short-term in-
debtedness does not constitute suﬃcient evidence. “Weaker” economies and those exposed to larger
shocks may in equilibrium issue debt at shorter durations. Moreover, in equilibrium, capital ﬂight
will almost mechanically be associated with a decline in investment, but it will not necessarily be
the ultimate or even the proximate cause.
Instead, we examine this mechanism at the micro level by examining the behavior of corporate
investment. This analysis involves comparing ﬁrms that face the same shift in aggregate credit
conditions, but diﬀer in their potential exposure. According to the maturity-mismatch hypothesis,
ﬁrms with excessive short-term debt should suﬀer most from the aggregate capital outﬂow.
We assemble a database with accounting information (including the maturity composition of
liabilities) for approximately 3000 publicly traded non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in emerging markets. The
countries represented in this sample consist of ﬁve East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand), seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) and three additional emerging markets (Israel, South
Africa, and Turkey). These data cover some of the largest emerging markets for 1990’s, a period
2of substantial capital-account volatility for most of these countries. In addition, there are ﬁrms in
our sample that hold substantial amounts of short-term debt. These elements constitute the two
ingredients necessary for examining the proposed mechanism. The choice of publicly listed ﬁrms
is determined exclusively by the availability of accounting data. Moreover, we concentrate on the
non-ﬁnancial sector of the economy, as it is here that investment decisions are ultimately carried
out.
The speciﬁc empirical strategy is to assess whether ﬁrms with more short-term exposure invest
less in the aftermath of capital ﬂight. We do so by estimating reduced-form equations for investment.
The proposed mechanism centers on the interaction of short-term indebtedness with capital ﬂows,
and so the key variable in the analysis is
( Short-Term Exposure )i,t−1 × ( Capital Flows )t
for ﬁrm i at time t. This analysis allows us to better understand whether the marginal unit of
debt is allocated across ﬁrms in such a way as to generate the large risk suggested by the maturity-
mismatch hypothesis. The hypothesis is that we should estimate a strong and positive eﬀect of this
interaction.
The main empirical result is that the investment response of relatively short-term-exposed ﬁrms
to aggregate capital ﬂows is statistically indistinguishable from that of ﬁrms that hold predomi-
nantly long-term debt. This ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of controls for preexisting ﬁrm
diﬀerences as well as to the interaction of these controls with aggregate macroeconomic variables.
We ﬁnd this non-result in spite of the strong prediction of the maturity-mismatch hypothesis: that
ﬁrms with more short-term debt should invest substantially less following an episode of capital
ﬂight. This non-result plays out at the regional level as well: no signiﬁcant, robust eﬀect is found
among East Asian or Latin American corporations. Moreover, we show that the ﬁnding is not
sensitive to using using a variety of diﬀerent estimators, alternative measures of capital ﬂows, and
controls for devaluation eﬀects and access to international capital.
Note that we do not claim that capital ﬂight is not associated with investment collapses. Indeed,
in these data, there is a strong, positive correlation between the two. Instead, we ﬁnd that capital
outﬂow does not diﬀerentially aﬀect ﬁrms with diﬀerent maturity structures of debt. Moreover,
the lack of any such relationship, we argue, indicates that this “maturity mismatch” channel may
simply not be of quantitative importance for these ﬁrms in this period.
Nor do we suggest that short-term-exposed corporations are indiﬀerent to capital ﬂight. Indeed,
3we ﬁnd the opposite. First, these ﬁrms face higher interest charges, some of which they pay
immediately and some of which is apparently recapitalized as debt going forward. In addition, they
are less able to raise external funds by issuing new debt. Moreover, we show that they liquidate
assets at a signiﬁcant loss. The equity holders of these ﬁrms lose, and the relevant counterparties
gain. Nevertheless, this transfer of resources out of the ﬁrm does not appear to aﬀect the investment
decision.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section II presents a description of the data
employed, while more detailed information on data sources is contained in Appendix A. Section III
contains the main empirical results for investment and debt maturity, while in Section IV, we
present sensitivity analysis. An estimates of changes in net worth across ﬁrms is found in Section V.
Section VI concludes.
II Data and Descriptive Statistics
II.A Construction of the Sample
This section describes our sample and variables. The principal source for the data employed in
this study is Worldscope (Thomson Financial, 2003), a database of ﬁrm-level accounting informa-
tion which has been input from the annual reports and corporate ﬁlings of mainly publicly traded
ﬁrms. Our sample consists of non-ﬁnancial corporations in 15 emerging markets. The data contain
accounting information from as far back as 1980 and from as recent as 2002, but the bulk of our
sample is from the decade of the 1990s. Table 1 shows the number of observations per country and
year. The size of the sample changes as new ﬁrms are listed and incorporated into the database.
Bankrupt or de-listed ﬁrms are not removed from Worldscope, and we track their eventual disposi-
tion (see below). For our estimates, we use a sample restricted to the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms for which
maturity-composition data is available.
We group the sample based on three broad categories. First, there are ﬁrms from ﬁve East Asian
countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Second, we include
data on corporations from seven countries in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile,
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Finally, for comparison purposes, we also include in our dataset
information from three additional emerging markets: Israel, South Africa, and Turkey.
Throughout the analysis, the main dependent variables are the various components of invest-
4ment. The ﬁrst is investment in ﬁxed capital, which is measured as expenditures on ﬁxed assets.
The second, investment in inventories, is deﬁned as the change in inventories in a given period.
Inventories include raw materials, work in progress and ﬁnished goods. The third measure of in-
vestment is the (cash generated from the) disposal of ﬁxed assets. The ﬁrst and third variables are
detailed in the cash-ﬂow statement. We opt not to use the change in net ﬁxed assets as a measure of
investment because accounting standards in some of the countries in our sample allow for arbitrary
revaluations of assets, making it impossible to separate investment from (endogenous) changes in
the accounting valuation of capital goods.
Each investment variable ﬁgures into the analysis in distinct ways. We investigate the response
of purchases of ﬁxed capital to better understand how the proposed mechanisms might aﬀect the
productive capacity of the ﬁrm in the medium term. On the other hand, it has also been argued that
falling net worth not only aﬀects the supply of long-term credit for investment, but it also aﬀects
the availability of short-term working capital. A shortage of working capital reduces the ﬁrm’s
capacity to purchase intermediate goods and pay for variable factors of production. To explore this
channel, we also examine the behavior of inventory investment. Finally, ﬁnancial crunches might
oblige ﬁrms to engage in “ﬁre sales” on their assets, a behavior that should be captured partly by
the disposal of ﬁxed assets. Columns 5–7 of Table 2 contain summary statistics for these investment
variables for each country in the sample.
In addition, the database contains other key information about the ﬁrm, such as its main
products, sectors of operation, ownership structure and a history of the main corporate events.
The main explanatory variable is short-term exposure, which is the diﬀerence between current
liabilities and current assets. Current liabilities includes all liabilities coming due in the upcoming
ﬁscal year. This measure includes debt issued at short maturities as well as long-term issuances
whose terminal date falls in the upcoming year. Current assets include highly liquid instruments
such as cash as well as holdings that are normally liquidated rapidly, such as inventories and other
intermediate goods. These variables plus total liabilities are summarized in Columns 1–4 of Table 2.
The original accounting data are then modiﬁed in four ways:
1. We inﬂate all data to 2002 values using December-December changes in the consumer price
index, and convert them to US dollars using the market exchange rate for December of 2002.
2. In the event of a merger, a spin-oﬀ or a split, we construct an artiﬁcial ﬁrm that contains all
of the component ﬁrms for the entire sample period. In the cases in which information on
5all component ﬁrms is not available, we drop the ﬁrm from the sample. Worldscope provides
information on the reasons for which accounting data is no longer updated on all ﬁrms. We
use this information to build our artiﬁcial ﬁrms.
3. In the event of bankruptcy, we assume that existing capital is liquidated and impute (dis)investment
values equal to the lagged ﬁxed capital stock in the following period.
4. We drop all ﬁrm/year observations if the accounting data is not self consistent. In particular,
we drop observations if short-term liabilities exceed total liabilities or if accounting variables
do not accord with sign conventions. This results in the deletion of 506 observations.
5. We compute the logarithmic change in total assets and construct a z-score using the sample
mean and standard deviation. We drop 106 ﬁrm/year observations that have |z| > 6. In
addition we construct z-scores for all dependent and independent variables and drop those
observations for which |z| > 6.
Note that our results are robust to changes in the treatment of bankrupt ﬁrms, changes in the
criteria for dropping outliers and in changes in the treatment of ﬁrms involved in a merger, a
spin-oﬀ or a split.1
Finally, the main macroeconomic variable employed in the present study is the net capital
account, expressed as a percentage of lagged GDP. These ﬂows exhibit substantial variability in
this period, and are prone to large movements, especially during crisis episodes such as the “Tequila
crisis” or the “Asian ﬂu”. (Please see Appendix A for more details on the data series.) The country-
level macro data is then merged with the ﬁrm data. Firms are mapped to countries on the basis of
where their stock is traded. Additional macroeconomic variables are described in the text as they
are introduced.
II.B Graphical Summaries
Several of the pertinent contrasts—and similarities–between the East Asia and Latin America are
evident in Figure 1. This ﬁgure displays kernel estimates of the probability density functions of
four variables central to the present study: the fraction of liabilities due in the upcoming year,
1Appendix Table 1 reports these robustness tests in detail. We also regress a binary indicator for these corporate
events on the speciﬁcations used below, and do not ﬁnd that our interaction variable of interest predicts having an
event.
6the fraction of assets that are “current”, the ratio of liabilities to assets, and the net short-term
exposure. The density estimates for the Asia sample are represented by a solid line, and the
estimates for Latin America are displayed as a dashed line.
The density estimates for debt maturity and overall leverage conﬁrm the conventional wisdom
about the balance-sheet deﬁciencies of East Asian corporations. In Panel A of Figure 1, we graph
the ratio of short-term to total liabilities. We see a marked diﬀerence between the regions on this
measure. While the Latin American distribution is roughly bell shaped and centered around six
tenths, the East Asia is shifted to the right (i.e., shorter term). Indeed, the mode of the Asia
density is almost at one (100% short term). Similarly, East Asian corporations tended to have
substantially greater liabilities than their Latin American counterparts, as seen in Panel C.
However, when we combine this with the other side of the balance sheet, the Asian situation
seems less dire. Of note in Panel B of Figure 1 is that the distribution of current (i.e., short term)
assets for East Asian corporates was also shifted to the short end, relative to Latin American ﬁrms.
To assess maturity structure on both sides of the balance sheet, we take the diﬀerence between
short-term liabilities and current assets, which we call short-term exposure. The regional density
estimates of this diﬀerence are displayed in Panel D. The Asia distribution does not exhibit the
rightward shifting seen in the case of short-term liabilities. Indeed, the densities from both regions
align very closely.
The regional similarity in the distribution hardly dispels preoccupations about the risk of short-
term exposure. Credit markets in either region may not be robust enough to transfer capital from
the lower to the upper tail (of Panel D) in a crisis. Moreover, this could be exacerbated for Asia
by the fact the distribution of short-term exposure is a bit more spread out than in Latin America.
On the other hand, the shocks to capital markets in East Asian may have placed a greater penalty
on short-term exposure. With these uncertainties in mind, we set out to measure the eﬀects of
short-term exposure below.
III Investment Regressions
In this section, we examine the “maturity mismatch” hypothesis and ﬁnd it lacking. We fail to ﬁnd
robust diﬀerences in the investment behavior among ﬁrms with very diﬀerent levels of potential
exposure to the ﬂight of capital from the country. Speciﬁcally, we propose and implement a simple
regression equation that allows for the estimation of diﬀerential responses to capital ﬂows by ﬁrms
7with diﬀerent maturity structures on their balance sheet. In almost every case, we ﬁnd that this
relationship is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and in no case do we ﬁnd a robustly signiﬁcant
eﬀect.
III.A Empirical Methodology
The central empirical question of this study is how the change in domestic credit interacts with
the maturity structure of ﬁrms’ balance sheet to alter investment behavior. Therefore, the key
explanatory variable in the analysis is the interaction of ﬁrm i’s lagged short-term exposure, expST
i,t−1,
with aggregate (net) capital ﬂows, ∆kjt, into country j at time t . (In what follows, we abbreviate
this second-order term as (expST × ∆k) for brevity.) The prediction of the maturity-mismatch
hypothesis is that ﬁrms with more short-term debt should invest less following an episode of capital
ﬂight. Since an outﬂow is deﬁned negatively, this implies a strongly positive coeﬃcient on (expST ×
∆k). (The exception being for the disposal of capital, for which we expect a negative relationship.)
In addition to the interaction, we include terms that control for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of balance-
sheet variables and macro conditions. Including the main eﬀect of short-term debt absorbs any pre-
existing diﬀerences among ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of short-term indebtedness. Such diﬀerences
might have prevailed in the absence of movements in the capital account, e.g., if expanding ﬁrms
were more likely to issue short-term debt than stagnant ones. (Below, we refer to lagged short-
debt exposure mnemonically as expST.) The macro main eﬀect, a ﬁxed eﬀect for country × year,
captures the macroeconomic changes that may impact all ﬁrms in the economy without regard to
the maturity composition of their balance sheet.
The basic speciﬁcation (for ﬁrm i in country j at year t) that results is
Iijt = β(expST
i,t−1 × ∆kt) + δjt + γexpST
i,t−1 + ijt (1)
in which Iijt is a measure of investment. We estimate this equation using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) on the accounting data described above. Note that investment is therefore modeled as
a function of predetermined micro-level variables plus the contemporaneous (macro) measure of
capital ﬂows, which is exogenous to any particular ﬁrm. Therefore, OLS can consistently estimate
this reduced-form equation. To equation 1, we also add additional ﬁrm and macroeconomic control
variables. For example, we typically include a control for lagged total debt and current assets, as
well as their interactions with the capital ﬂow. Other examples are detailed below.
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Among ﬁrms in our sample, we ﬁnd no robust, statistically signiﬁcant evidence that short-term
exposure reduced investment following capital ﬂight. We employ the empirical methodology detailed
above, and pay particular attention to the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction of lagged short-
term debt and capital ﬂows, (expST×∆k). We generally estimate this coeﬃcient to be insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero: i.e., approximately the same response of investment by “short-term” and “long-
term” ﬁrms to aggregate capital ﬂows.
This result can be seen in Table 3, which contains estimates of equation (1) and variants.
Columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) show the estimate of the simplest equation, a speciﬁcation that con-
sists exclusively of (expST ×∆k), the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of lagged short-term debt, and country×year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns (2), (5), (8), and (11) add leverage and current assets as controls and as
interactions with the capital ﬂows. Finally, in Columns (3), (6), (9), and (12), the speciﬁcation
also includes a lagged dependent variable as an independent regressor. The inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable allows for the presence of adjustment costs. We estimate the eﬀect on current-
year investment in Panel A, whereas Panel B contains results for investment for the following year
as the dependent variable. (Note that all the micro-level variables are lagged one year, so “current
year” means contemporaneous with the macro variable. For Panel B, the dependent variable is
from period t + 1 and the lagged dependent variable is therefore from period t.) We review the
results for each type of investment in turn in the following paragraphs.
First, the interaction of short-exposure and capital ﬂows is not a robust determinant of capital
expenditures. The basic result for capital expenditures are the most favorable to the maturity-
mismatch hypothesis. In Column (1), we see that the OLS estimation of equation (1) without
additional controls yields a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on (expST × ∆k). However, this is
not robust to the inclusion of additional balance sheet data or of the lagged dependent variable. We
also estimate a positive correlation between short-term exposure and investment in Column (1).
When total debt and its capital-ﬂow interaction are both added to the regression (shown in Column
(2)), the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of expST is no longer signiﬁcant.
Second, (expST × ∆k) is not a robust, correctly signed determinant of the disposal of ﬁxed
assets. The more parsimonious speciﬁcations yield signiﬁcant, positive estimates of the eﬀect of
(expST × ∆k) on asset sales. However, this eﬀect is weaker upon inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable. In any case, since we expect more asset disposal by short-term-exposed ﬁrms when the
9capital account is negative, the initial results have the apparently incorrect sign. This raises a
possible limitation of the accounting data: sales of assets measure price × quantity. If ﬁnancially
distressed are forced into holding “ﬁre sales” of their assets, the response of price might exceed
the response of quantity. To be sure that our results are not contaminated by price eﬀect, we also
examine the extensive margin of disposal.2 These results are located in Columns (7) through (9)
of Table 3. We ﬁnd no robust and signiﬁcant eﬀect of (expST ×∆k) on the probability that a ﬁrm
sells ﬁxed assets.
Third, the coeﬃcient on (expST × ∆k) is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all speciﬁcations
for inventory investment. This result is peculiar since the inability to renew short-term debt should
restrict ﬁrms’ working capital particularly. Firms apparently do not run down inventories in order
to make up this gap. On the other hand, the interaction of current assets with capital ﬂows is
estimated to be signiﬁcant, but with a puzzling sign (more liquid assets should be good in the face
of capital ﬂight).
These tests most likely do not suﬀer from a lack of statistical power due to noisy ﬁrm data. One
could argue that poor accounting standards introduce substantial noise into these measures. On the
other hand, a common argument is that poor standards introduce not noise, but systematic biases
such as exaggeration of proﬁts. Either way, it is clear from the results that accounting variables, in
ﬁrst-order form, are signiﬁcant predictors of the various investment variables. This indicates that
the data are not so error prone. It is only when we look for interactions of short-term exposure
with macro shocks that we generally do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects.
III.C Regional Comparisons
The non-eﬀect of short-term exposure from above is seen in our regional analysis as well. Table 4
contains regression results for each region and for each investment variable. The regression speci-
ﬁcation is as in Column (3) of Table 3, with a lagged dependent variable and with total liabilities
and current assets entering in ﬁrst-order form and as interactions with the net capital account. In
no case do we estimate a signiﬁcant (and correctly signed) eﬀect of (expST × ∆k) on investment.
Regional diﬀerences do emerge on some of the other interactions. Using the samples from Latin
America and from the additional emerging markets, we estimate all of interaction eﬀects to be
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for current investment. On the other hand, several interaction
2Approximately ﬁfty percent of the ﬁrm/year observations are characterized by some sales of ﬁxed assets.
10terms are estimated to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the East Asian sample. The interaction
of current assets with capital ﬂows has roughly equal and opposite eﬀects on capital expenditures
and inventory investment. While the net eﬀect is a statistical zero, it is noteworthy that some sort
of shifting is apparently induced by (expST ×∆k). We also estimate a signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect of
the interaction between liabilities and capital ﬂows for several types of investment, which suggests
that ﬁrms with higher leverage in East Asia were more vulnerable to capital ﬂight.
IV Sensitivity Analysis
The result from above is not sensitive to a wide variety of changes in the econometric speciﬁcation,
as we show in this section. These alternative speciﬁcations include using diﬀerent estimators and
alternative measures of capital ﬂows. Further, we show that the result for (expST × ∆k) is robust
to the inclusion of control variables for access to external capital and changing relative prices.
IV.A Alternative Estimators
We estimate the eﬀect of (expST ×∆k) using numerous alternative estimators, all of which deliver
similar estimates of (expST × ∆k) to those above. These new results are seen in Table 5 and
described in this subsection.
We begin with alternative computations for the standard errors using the ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimator. These estimates employ the speciﬁcation from Table 3, Column 2, which includes
ﬁrst-order and capital-ﬂow-interaction eﬀects of short-term exposure, total liabilities, and current
assets. Each Panel displays only the estimates on (expST × ∆k). (Note that the point estimates
do not change in Panels A-D, only the standard errors.) Panel A contains the basic OLS stan-
dard errors, i.e., assuming no heteroskedasticity and no intraclass correlation. Panel B reports
Huber-White (“robust”) standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity. (These are the default
throughout the present study.) Panel C allows for corrects the errors for the presence of correlated
disturbances across ﬁrms within each country × year cell. Finally, in computing the standard errors,
the estimator in Panel D allows for fairly generic correlational structures within ﬁrm. The size of
the standard errors generally increases as we read down the Panels, but the pattern of signiﬁcance
is essentially the same.
These results are essentially unchanged if we add a one-period lag of the dependent variable.
These estimates of the eﬀect of (expST × ∆k) are shown in Panel E (which replicates parts of
11Table 3). This provides a useful check for the above estimates insofar as ﬁrms experience persistent
shocks.
When we control more ﬂexibly for the predetermined variables, very little changes in our es-
timates. Above, we use linear terms to control for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of the lagged accounting
variable (expST, total debt and current assets). In Panel F, we allow the eﬀects of the predeter-
mined accounting variables (short-term exposure, total debt, current assets) to be highly ﬂexible
by including them as polynomial of order ten. In eﬀect, we are parametrically matching ﬁrms based
on their t − 1 characteristics. The estimates are qualitatively similar using this technique, with
the major exception that the anomalous result for the disposal (sale) of ﬁxed assets is no longer
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Controlling for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects does not generate estimates that favor the maturity-
mismatch hypothesis. In Panel G, we add ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects to the speciﬁcations. Similar esti-
mates are obtained, except for the contemporaneous response of capital expenditures to (expST ×
∆k) (for which the estimate is signiﬁcant but opposite of the excepted sign). We combine the
matching estimator with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in Panel H, and ﬁnd uniformly insigniﬁcant eﬀects of
(expST × ∆k) on all the studied investment outcomes. This includes an insigniﬁcant result for ex-
penditures (versus Panel G, Column 1) and for disposal (versus the majority of the Panels above).
Finally, the addition of an autocorrelated error term yields substantially similar results. We
allow for an autoregressive error of order one (AR(1)) at the ﬁrm level in the estimation of the
ﬁxed-eﬀects model. These results are found in Panel I. The estimated standard errors tend to be
larger than those found above, and the point estimates are similar. Consequently, none of the
estimates of (expST × ∆k) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
IV.B Alternative Normalizations
Above we normalized the accounting variables by lagged total assets, but we obtain similar results
for (expST ×∆k) with alternative normalization schemes. These new estimates are found in Table 6.
Panel A repeats the baseline estimates from above. In Panel B, we consider a broader measure
of (lagged) ﬁrm value: outstanding debt plus market capitalization. In Panel C, we normalize
instead by the lagged capital stock (or stock of inventories in the case of inventory investment). In
Panels D and E, we scale the independent variables by lagged assets and ﬁrm value, respectively, but
12normalize the investment variables with the lagged stocks as above.3 In no instance do we estimate
an eﬀect of (expST ×∆k) that is consistent with the maturity-mismatch hypothesis. Renormalizing
the investment variables by lagged capital stocks does render insigniﬁcant, in most instances, the
interactions of the net capital account with current assets.4
IV.C Alternative Measures of Capital Flows
In this subsection, we estimate the eﬀect of (expST ×∆k) using interactions of exposure with various
alternative macroeconomic variables.
We start by looking at the diﬀerential eﬀects on ﬁrm level investment of capital inﬂows net of
foreign direct investment (FDI). We exclude foreign direct investment to control for the possibility
that “ﬁre sale FDI” takes place during a balance of payment crisis. So far we have associated an
international liquidity shock with low foreign investment and the exiting of investors from the crisis
economy. However, a liquidity crisis could also consistent with an inﬂow of foreign capital, in the
form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), that seeks to take advantage of proﬁtable investment
opportunities in the hands of cash-strapped domestic corporations5. We report these results in
Panel B of Table 7. As in our baseline speciﬁcation, we fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect
of short-term exposure on the response of investment to capital ﬂows.
Many of the capital-ﬂow reversals in our sample coincide with periods of high domestic interest
rates, a result of dogged defenses of the exchange rate by domestic monetary authorities. The result
is that ﬁrms wishing to roll-over short term liabilities are restricted by the lack of both international
and domestic liquidity. To capture this eﬀect we introduce a measure of shocks to the supply of
domestic credit in our investment speciﬁcations. Because data on interest rates is patchy, and has
the added complication of having to separate real rates from expected inﬂation, we proxy local
credit conditions using the change in domestic credit over lagged GDP. We start by estimating our
baseline speciﬁcation and replacing net capital inﬂows with changes in credit. The results of this
estimation are reported in Panel C. Next, in Panel D, we include both the interaction of exposure
with capital inﬂows and changes in private credit. In all cases we fail to obtain coeﬃcient estimates
3We also reproduce these speciﬁcations, but re-weight the data by the lagged ﬁxed-capital or inventory stock, as
appropriate. Results are similar.
4We also replicated Table 6 using the “exposure only” speciﬁcation seen in Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 of Table 3.
The signiﬁcant estimates of (exp
ST ×∆k) in those columns disappear when the lagged stock is used to normalize the
accounting variables.
5Aguiar and Gopinath (2002) ﬁnd that there was a substantial increase in M&A activity in South East Asia
between 1996 and 1998. See also Krugman (1998).
13on the (expST × ∆k) interaction that are statistically signiﬁcant.
As an additional test of the robustness of our main results, we repeat the speciﬁcations reported
in the previous three panels normalizing the measures of capital ﬂows and changes in private credit
to zero mean and unit standard deviation by country. The results (reported in Panels E through
G of Table 7) are qualitatively identical to the results presented in Panels A though C.
Finally, in Panels H and I we report the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction between
exposure and the spread over US T-Bills of the JP Morgan EMBI bond index. Panel H uses the
country speciﬁc spread (when available), while Panel I uses the aggregate EMBI spread, which
should be taken a proxy of ﬁnancing conditions for emerging markets in general. In both cases
the sample size drops: in the ﬁrst case because EMBI data is only available for a sub-sample of
countries, in the second because data is only available after 1991. Consistent with our previous
results, we fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on any of the interactions between exposure
and either of the EMBI spreads.
Could it be that the relationship between capital inﬂows and short-term exposure is non-linear,
so that it is only in periods of low inﬂows (or capital-ﬂow reversals) that exposed ﬁrms fare worse
than their counterparts? We explore this question in the rest of Table 7.
We start with an indicator variable for periods in which capital inﬂows are below the country
median over the period 1985–2002 (low inﬂows). In Panel J we interact this indicator variable with
short term exposure, while in Panel K we interact the indicator variable with (expST × ∆k), thus
allowing for an asymmetrical eﬀect of capital inﬂows. The next two panels replicate this exercise,
but deﬁne the indicator dummy with respect to the country mean minus one standard deviation
(crisis inﬂows). For most investment variables (current and next period) we obtain statistically
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the interactions of short term exposure with the dummy variables and
for the two interactions of exposure with net capital inﬂows. One exception are the capital disposal
variables, which display the familiar anomalous coeﬃcients, although these anomalies seem to
obtain in periods of inﬂows in the interactive models.
Next, we consider investment behavior around particular episodes of capital-account reversals
and fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of short-term exposure following capital ﬂight. These episodes
are enumerated in Table 8. Table 9 shows the result of estimating the diﬀerential eﬀects of the
Calvo et al (2004) measure of sudden stops. Instead of pooling the whole sample, we concentrate
on the fall in investment in the vicinity of the sudden-stop episodes. To do so we run a series of
14regressions in which we include observations on ﬁrm investment from t−1 (the period prior to the
sudden stop) and either t, t+1 or t+2. Note that each regression has observations from only two
periods. The key variable in this speciﬁcation is the interaction between the post dummy (which
takes on a value of one in t, t + 1 or t + 2) and short term exposure. For this speciﬁcation, we
expect a negative coeﬃcient estimate on ((expST) × Post) in the capital-expenditure and inventory
regressions, and positive signs in the asset-disposal equations. The odd-numbered columns report
estimates of speciﬁcations with expST, (expST × ∆k), and Post only, while the even-numbered
columns also include interactions between the post dummy and lagged liabilities and between the
post dummy and lagged current assets.
We ﬁnd that, following a sudden stop, the behavior of capital expenditures in ﬁrms with high
exposure is, in almost all cases, statistically indistinguishable from the behavior of ﬁrms with low
exposure (columns 1–6). This result holds for the full sample, for sudden stop episodes in Asia
and for those in Latin America. The only (expST× Post) coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant
in both speciﬁcations is that for period t + 2 in Latin America, however, the estimated coeﬃcient
is the opposite sign to what we expected. In turn, for inventory investment, disposal of ﬁxed
assets and the disposal dummy, either the coeﬃcients on (expST× Post) become insigniﬁcant once
the additional controls are included, or the estimated coeﬃcients have opposite signs to what we
expected.
All in all the results presented in this subsection conﬁrm our main results: we fail to ﬁnd
signiﬁcant, robust diﬀerences in the response of investment to international liquidity shocks across
ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of short-term exposure.
IV.D Additional Controls
Even though episodes of capital ﬂight are times in which relative prices change markedly, we argue
that this is unlikely to contaminate our results. To a ﬁrst approximation, this should load onto the
macroeconomic variables (not the interaction terms) since all the ﬁrms in the economy face these
same price changes. On the other hand, ﬁrms with more expST might face diﬀerential changes in
prices, a hypothesis we consider (and discard) in this subsection.
One possibility arises because changing credit-market conditions presumably have eﬀects that
work through channels other than expST. If short-term-exposed ﬁrms also have diﬀerential access to
international (or domestic) capital, then our results may come from having omitted this “access”
15variable in the estimates of investment responses to capital ﬂows. We assess this hypothesis in
Table 10 by constructing proxies for capital access and controlling for them (interacted with ∆k)
in the investment regressions. In Panel A, we interact whether the ﬁrm had an ADR account in
year t − 1 with subsequent capital ﬂows. There is mixed evidence on the eﬀect of this interaction,
but its inclusion does not materially alter the estimates of (expST × ∆k). Similarly in Panels B
and C, respectively, we control for the ﬁrm having an active listing in the local stock market, or a
cross listing elsewhere. Again, the crucial new control is the interaction of these dummies with the
capital account. As with the ADRs, when we include these controls the estimates of (expST ×∆k)
change very little. A credit crunch might also have a greater impact on smaller ﬁrms. However, the
inclusion of controls for ﬁrm size hardly changes the result for (expST × ∆k), as seen in Panel D.
An interesting additional result is that small ﬁrms appear to be more vulnerable to capital ﬂight.
Finally, we include interactions of industry (SIC1) dummies with the net capital account. As seen
in Panel E, we obtain similar estimates of the eﬀect of short-term exposure when including these
additional controls.
Another possibility is that short-term and long-term-indebted ﬁrms systematically diﬀerent in
the exchange-rate sensitivity of their non-ﬁnancial prices, perhaps because of diﬀering propensities
across sectors to issue short-term debt. Since the capital account and the exchange rate often move
together, there is potentially an omitted variable: the change in proﬁt opportunities resulting from
the exchange-rate movement. We consider this hypothesis in Table 11. As a ﬁrst approximation for
measuring changing proﬁt opportunities we include earnings (measured by EBITDA) in our baseline
speciﬁcation. Second, in Panel B, we include the interactions of exposure, current assets and total
liabilities with changes in the real exchange rate. Next, Panel C, includes interactions between
changes in the real exchange rate and 1 digit SIC dummies, while Panel D includes interactions
between a dummy for exporting ﬁrms and the change in the real exchange rate. Finally, Panel E
combines these last two sets of interactions in one speciﬁcation. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that detailed
time-varying sectoral controls6 (Panel F), which do not substantially aﬀect the coeﬃcient estimate
on (expST × ∆k) either.
Similarly, the short-term exposure of the ﬁrm could be correlated with its currency composition
of debt, because of so called “original sin” (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). According to this
view, ﬁrms in emerging markets can either borrow short term or in a foreign currency. This being
6These include indicators for country × year × SIC1.
16the case, ﬁrms face a tradeoﬀ between currency risk and interest-rate/rollover risk. It should be
noted that we do not know the currency composition of the debt, so we cannot directly test for the
importance of the interaction of foreign-currency debt (D∗) with the exchange rate (∆e). Instead,
our approach is to add the interaction (expST
i,t−1 × ∆ejt) to the regression. Note that we do not
promote this variable as the deﬁnitive proxy for currency-mismatch eﬀects. What we argue is that
it serves to determine whether the earlier estimates are contaminated by the suggested omitted-
variable bias.7 As seen in Panel B of Table 11, the inclusion of interactions among the debt variables
and ∆e does not yield substantially diﬀerent estimates of the eﬀect of (expST ×∆k). On the other
hand, the question of the interaction of maturity and currency mismatches during a crisis is explored
directly by Bleakley (2003). In a sample of Latin American ﬁrms, he ﬁnds a negative correlation
between short-term and foreign-currency debt. However, the omission of currency composition of
debt is found not to aﬀect the conclusions regarding the eﬀects of short-term exposure.
Belonging to business groups and conglomerates (such as the chaebol in Korea or grupos in
Mexico) provides access to an internal capital market, which may distort the choice of debt maturity
and confound the eﬀect of this debt in periods of capital outﬂow. To assess how this aﬀects our
estimates of (expST × ∆k), we assemble additional information on the ownership characteristics
of the corporations in our sample.8 For the Latin American subsample, we use the Corporate
Aﬃliations database (Lexis-Nexis, 2003) to measure ownership characteristics. The ﬁrst category,
labelled “subsidiary” in the Table, denotes subsidiaries or joint ventures. A second category is
created for aﬃliates, and a third for corporations with diluted ownership. The omitted category
is for those ﬁrms that do not appear in the Corporate Aﬃliations database. In the East Asian
subsample, we use the classiﬁcation scheme for ownership described by Claessens, Djankov, and
Lang (2000).9 The ﬁrst category is for those corporations that are widely held, i.e. that do not have
signiﬁcant concentration of ownership. We create three additional categories for ﬁrms aﬃliated with
banks, families, and governments. Finally, the omitted category is for those ﬁrms left unclassiﬁed
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8It should be noted that these variables are from a single point in time. In East Asian, information is from 1996,
while in Latin America it is from 2003.
9We thank Todd Mitton for providing with these data.
17by Claessens et al.. For both regions, the categories are mutually exclusive.
Controlling for aﬃliations does not aﬀect our main result for maturity mismatch. In Table 12, we
include these ownership indicators in the regression, interacted with the capital account. Because
the data are diﬀerent by region, we run the analysis separately for Latin America and East Asia.
In Panels A and C, we present the baseline results for (expST × ∆k). In Panels B and D, we show
results from regressions that allow for diﬀerent sensitivities to the capital account across ownership
classes. While there is some evidence that corporations with group aﬃliations respond diﬀerently
to the capital account, the inclusion of these controls does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our estimates of
(expST × ∆k).
V Eﬀect on the Net Worth
We discuss the response of ﬁnancial and income variables to (expST × ∆k) in this Section. A
plausible explanation for the results might have been that ﬁrms had successfully managed the risks
associated with short-term exposure through ﬁnancial derivatives, perhaps. What we show in this
Section contradicts this notion. Short-term-exposed ﬁrms incur higher debt and interest obligations
going forward. There is also evidence of liquidation of assets at bargain prices In all, we estimate
a substantial transfer of wealth out of ﬁrms with more expST.
V.A Financing Variables
On average, short-term-exposed ﬁrms see their ﬁnancial positions deteriorate with a capital outﬂow.
This is consistent with the maturity-mismatch hypothesis in that more short-term exposure means
more exposure to interest-rate shocks. We also ﬁnd that the short-term-exposed ﬁrms did not choose
(or were unable) to repay their obligations that came due during the capital outﬂow. Instead, they
absorbed the shock by taking on higher interest and debt obligations.
The results for the full sample are found in Table 13. In the current year (i.e., contemporane-
ous with the capital account), there is evidence of signiﬁcant eﬀects of (expST × ∆k) on interest
payments, but less robust evidence of an eﬀect on total debt or new issuances of debt. In the year
following the aggregate capital ﬂow, we estimate a strong relationship between (expST × ∆k) and
total debt. In other words, short-term-exposed ﬁrms saw signiﬁcant increases in their indebtedness
in the aftermath of a capital outﬂow from the home country. We also estimate statistically signiﬁ-
cant reductions in the gross issuance of new debt among short-term exposure ﬁrms following capital
18outﬂows, but at the same time less debt is retired, and as a result there is no eﬀect of (expST ×∆k)
on net issuances.
V.B Income Statement
In this subsection, we address the eﬀects of short-term exposure on ﬁrm income. We ﬁnd that during
capital outﬂows ﬁrms with higher short-term exposure experience a larger drop in non-operating
income. Part of this is mechanical, and operates via higher interest rate expenses. Another part,
however is due to fall in non-interest components of the non-operating income. Evidence from a
sub-sample of ﬁrms for which data is available suggests that part of the fall is due to losses stemming
from asset sales. Firms with higher short term exposure are forced to hold a “ﬁre sale” of assets in
order to deal with liquidity problems.
The results for the full sample are reported in panel A of Table 14. Each cell of the table
reports the estimated coeﬃcient on the (expST × ∆k) interaction for a regression in which the
dependent variable is a component of the income statement. In the ﬁrst row, the dependent
variable is operating income, i.e., that income which is directly related to the ﬁrm’s main line of
operation. As reported, we fail to ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on the (expST × ∆k) interaction for
either contemporary or period-t+1 operating income. Where we do ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient is for period-t non-operating income: ﬁrms with higher short-term exposure see a larger
deterioration in this category of income following a capital outﬂow. The next three rows report
results for diﬀerent components of non-operating income. The ﬁrst is income from interest bearing
assets or equity holdings of non-subsidiaries. We ﬁnd no diﬀerential response to an outﬂow across
diﬀerent levels of exposure for this variable. The second is accrued interest expenses. As discussed
in the previous subsection, ﬁrms with more short-term debt are more exposed to volatile interest
rates. The result is higher interest costs in periods of outﬂows. The third category is a broad income
category that includes, amongst other things, losses from sale of assets. We obtain a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the (expST × ∆k)interaction for this category of income.
To determine what may be driving the positive result for the other-non-operating-income cat-
egory, we repeat our estimation for the sub-sample of ﬁrms for which data on the loss from sale
of assets is available. This component of the income statement measures diﬀerences between the
accounting value of assets and the price at which they were sold. The estimated coeﬃcient indicates
that ﬁrms with higher short-term exposure experience higher losses due to asset sales in periods
19of outﬂows, and that in the sub-sample, approximately 25% of the period t eﬀect of exposure on
other-non-operating-income is due to these losses. As our previous results for total value of liquida-
tion failed to ﬁnd a negative diﬀerential eﬀect, we interpret this result as evidence of higher losses
per unit sold. Firms with higher exposure are more likely to “ﬁre-sell” their assets in periods of
capital-ﬂow reversal.
The last two rows of panel A report the estimated coeﬃcients on (expST ×∆k) when measures
of cash ﬂow replace income as the dependent variable. The results are in line with the income
statement results: we ﬁnd a non signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the (expST × ∆k) interaction for cash
ﬂow from operations but a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).
VI Discussion of Average Investment
In this section we explore, and discard, two alternative hypotheses for our lack of results. The ﬁrst
alternative explanation for the lack of a diﬀerential response to capital outﬂows across short term
exposure is that the variance of our LHS variables collapses to zero around these episodes. Simply
put, if all ﬁrms invest zero, then it will be impossible to ﬁnd diﬀerences across categories. Although
the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on many interaction variables in previous speciﬁcations suggest that this
is not the case, we explore this hypothesis in this section directly by looking at the dispersion of
investment around episodes of capital ﬂow reversal. The second explanation is that our sample of
ﬁrms is not representative, so that the large collapse in investment observed during these “crises”
occurs only elsewhere in the economy, speciﬁcally in small unlisted ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that this is not
the case. Indeed, as shown below, the elsaticity of aggregate investment in our sample to capital
ﬂows is remarkably similar in magnitued to the elasticity of private gross ﬁxed capital formation
as reported by national accounts.
VI.A Changes in the Distribution of Investment
In Figure 2, we see how the cross-ﬁrm distribution of investment changed during the crisis episodes
that qualiﬁed as “sudden stops”10. Panel A contains estimates of the probability density function
of investment (deﬁned as the sum of all investment components above), while Panel B plots the
10These episodes are speciﬁed in Table 8.
20time path of the ﬁrst and second moments. In the notation of the Figure, a crisis starts in year t.
The distribution of investment is quite similar in years t − 1 and t − 2. In the year of the sudden
stop (i.e., year t), the investment distribution shifts somewhat to the left, and is slightly more
dispersed. Going forward, investment is dramatically lower and the distribution is tighter around
the mean in years t + 1 and t + 2. In this time span, average investment declines by more than
50%, while the standard deviation drops by around 15%.
In light of this evidence, can the results from Section III be explained as being because “no
one was investing anyway” in these episodes?11 We suggest that they cannot. First, dispersion
of investment actually rises in the year in which the sudden stop in capital ﬂows (and corporate
investment) begins. Second, while the cross-ﬁrm dispersion in investment is lower in the two years
following the crises, the standard deviation is only lower by some ﬁfteen percent of the starting
value.
VI.B Corporate versus Aggregate Response
While the focus of the present study is the corporate sector, it is worth considering how the full
economy’s investment responds to capital ﬂight. Large, publicly traded ﬁrms generally have better
access to external capital, and it is natural to wonder whether this advantage helps them endure the
credit-market shocks better than the small and medium enterprises in the same economy. More-
over, if, in the face of these shocks, the large corporations turn to domestic sources of credit, their
retrenchment might displace the smaller ﬁrms. On the other hand, it is precisely the large corpo-
rations that are more exposed to international shocks because they are more likely to participate
in international capital markets.
We construct comparable measures of investment for both our sample and the broader economy.
We focus on purchases of equipment and structures, which correspondes to ﬁxed-capital purchases
from the cash-ﬂow statement in our sample and to gross ﬁxed-capital formation in the national
accounts (and in the WEO). Because the strategy from above of normalizing by lagged assets is not
feasible for the aggregate data, we consider yearly logarithmic changes in the CPI-deﬂated levels
of investment, and thereby construct a time series of growth rates for each country represented in
our sample.
We regress these two investment variables on capital ﬂows for the panel of countries in our
11We are grateful to Peter Garber for suggesting this as a possible explanation for our results.
21data. These results are found in Table 15. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the ﬁxed-capital
investment of the entire private sector. In Panel B, capital expenditures from our sample of publicly
traded ﬁrms are on the left-hand side.12 These resulting estimates are of similar magnitude (not
simply the same sign) for the two series. The major systematic diﬀerence that emerges is that the
corporate sector tends to have a stronger contemporaneous response to the capital account, while
the broader private sector has a larger response in the following year. This is consistent with the
smaller ﬁrms being exposed to international shocks, with a delay, through the banking system.
Nevertheless, the total eﬀect over time of the capital account is similar across sectors.
VII Conclusions
Using micro data from emerging-market corporations, we examine the response of investment to
aggregate capital ﬂows. We do not ﬁnd robust and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the in-
vestment response among ﬁrms with very diﬀerent levels of potential exposure to the ﬂight of
capital from the country. This evidence casts doubt on the importance of corporate-level maturity
mismatch in these countries.
We obtain a series of additional results that we believe merit further research. First, we ﬁnd that
some categories of ﬁrms do experience large drops in investment during capital-account reversals.
This is the case of highly leveraged ﬁrms in East Asia, and the smaller ﬁrms throughout our
sample. Second, we ﬁnd that short-term exposure does have eﬀects on ﬁrm outcomes. In periods of
capital outﬂows those ﬁrms in our sample with higher exposure: accumulate more debt, incur higher
interest costs, have lower non-operational income, and sell-oﬀ assets with larger mark-downs. Many
of these results suggest important transfers of wealth within the economy (and potential across
borders as well). We also ﬁnd that ﬁrm with higher exposure are less likely to access new debt
ﬁnancing following a slow down in capital inﬂows, suggestting they are forced to obtain ﬁnancing
for their production and investment elsewhere, be it internal or by seeking external sources of equity
ﬁnancing.
12While the latter series is a component of the former, it does not represent more than twenty percent of investment
in the private sector in any country we study.
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25Figure 2: Changes in the Distribution of Investment Following A Sudden Stop
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Notes: Total investment is the sum of capital expenditures, (minus) disposal of ﬁxed assets, and inventory investment. In-
vestment is normalized by lagged assets. The sample is restricted to ﬁrms in those countries that experienced “Sudden Stop”
episodes. (See text for further sample and variable descriptions.) Panel A contains estimates of probability density functions
in the years before, during, and after a sudden stop. Each curve is an estimate from a particular year (relative to episode),
as indicated by the line style. The x-axis is total investment over lagged assets and the y-axis plots the estimated density.
Panel B contains a plot of the movement of the mean and standard deviation of total investment around sudden-stop episodes.
The x-axis is the number of years relative to the initial onset of the sudden stop, while the y-axis plots the indicated sample








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Balance Sheet Variables                  Measures of Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Short-term Current Short-term Capital Change in Disposal
Liabilities Liabilities Assets Exposure Expenditures Inventory of Fixed
(c2)-(c3) Stock Assets
Countries:
0.592 0.397 0.445 -0.048 0.077 0.005 0.008
East Asia (0.357) (0.311) (0.200) (0.342) (0.119) (0.062) (0.023)
[11486] [11498] [11498] [11498] [10187] [10213] [9016]
0.590 0.395  0.473 -0.078  0.097  0.008  0.009 
Indonesia (0.333) (0.317) (0.207) (0.372) (0.148) (0.073) (0.026)
[1161] [1161] [1161] [1161] [1042] [1038] [1031]
0.704 0.416 0.478 -0.062  0.071 0.007 0.011 
South Korea (0.340) (0.219) (0.177) (0.251) (0.091) (0.054) (0.027)
[3870] [3875] [3875] [3875] [3332] [3454] [2489]
0.494 0.385 0.441 -0.056 0.070 0.004 0.008
Malaysia (0.382) (0.370) (0.213) (0.388) (0.117) (0.067) (0.022)
[3603] [3605] [3605] [3605] [3270] [3229] [3052]
0.445 0.270 0.325 -0.054 0.105 0.001 0.005
Philippines (0.281) (0.226) (0.197) (0.263) (0.185) (0.047) (0.022)
[621] [621] [621] [621] [604] [577] [552]
0.600 0.421 0.414 0.007 0.080 0.004 0.005
Thailand (0.375) (0.357) (0.213) (0.396) (0.122) (0.063) (0.018)
[2231] [2236] [2236] [2236] [1939] [1915] [1892]
0.458 0.263 0.332 -0.069 0.074 0.005 0.005
Latin America (0.279) (0.221) (0.189) (0.248) (0.099) (0.046) (0.020)
[5466] [5469] [5469] [5469] [4809] [4944] [3772]
0.439 0.279 0.341 -0.061 0.077 0.001 0.003
Argentina (0.229) (0.208) (0.197) (0.264) (0.099) (0.049) (0.015)
[524] [524] [524] [524] [449] [466] [367]
0.518 0.308 0.333 -0.025 0.073 0.006 0.004
Brazil (0.357) (0.278) (0.199) (0.303) (0.105) (0.047) (0.018)
[1968] [1971] [1971] [1971] [1742] [1842] [1350]
0.379 0.193 0.304 -0.112 0.087 0.006 0.009
Chile (0.193) (0.128) (0.187) (0.161) (0.106) (0.034) (0.025)
[968] [968] [968] [968] [847] [830] [691]
0.392 0.216 0.316 -0.100 0.054 0.005 0.008
Colombia (0.228) (0.166) (0.191) (0.127) (0.068) (0.048) (0.018)
[262] [262] [262] [262] [238] [251] [216]
0.465 0.250 0.346 -0.096 0.071 0.005 0.005
Mexico (0.244) (0.209) (0.172) (0.234) (0.092) (0.049) (0.019)
[1273] [1273] [1273] [1273] [1106] [1122] [837]
0.439 0.292 0.362 -0.070 0.066 0.007 0.007
Peru (0.241) (0.184) (0.186) (0.221) (0.105) (0.054) (0.024)
[336] [336] [336] [336] [302] [303] [207]
0.333 0.201 0.303 -0.102 0.054 -0.008 0.006
Venezuela (0.153) (0.108) (0.161) (0.185) (0.061) (0.027) (0.024)
[135] [135] [135] [135] [125] [130] [104]
0.501 0.367 0.560 -0.193 0.108 0.002 0.008
Other Emerging Markets: (0.241) (0.180) (0.220) (0.199) (0.134) (0.068) (0.022)
[5706] [5706] [5706] [5706] [5303] [5240] [3859]
0.443 0.267 0.542 -0.274 0.067 0.010 0.007
Israel (0.209) (0.134) (0.240) (0.262) (0.059) (0.053) (0.018)
[432] [432] [432] [432] [390] [372] [309]
0.538 0.402 0.606 -0.204 0.133 -0.002 0.003
Turkey (0.259) (0.178) (0.196) (0.188) (0.154) (0.071) (0.016)
[3097] [3097] [3097] [3097] [2804] [2773] [2047]
0.460 0.336 0.497 -0.161 0.082 0.005 0.015
South Africa (0.219) (0.190) (0.246) (0.200) (0.114) (0.065) (0.028)
[2177] [2177] [2177] [2177] [2109] [2095] [1503]
Notes: Each cell contains a summary statistic for sampled ﬁrms in the indicated country or region. The top cell in each group
is the mean. The middle cell (in parenthesis) reports the standard deviation, and the bottom cell [in square brackets] indicates
the number of observations. Variables (listed by column) are as described in the text. Short-term exposure in the diﬀerence




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 4: Regional Comparisons
           Samples and Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Disposal of Fixed Assets Disposal of Fixed Assets > 0 Inventory Investment
East Latin Other East Latin Other East Latin Other East Latin Other
Independent Variables: Asia America Countries Asia America Countries Asia America Countries Asia America Countries
Panel A: Dependent Variables from the Current Year
Interactions with Capital Flows:
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.025  -0.316  0.063  0.048  -0.121  0.126  0.144  0.242  -1.037  0.028  -0.039  0.327 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.334) (0.665) (0.028) * (0.089) (0.150) (0.411) (1.017) (1.842) (0.074) (0.221) (0.424)
Leverage x 0.182  -0.061  -0.261  -0.003  0.075  -0.038  0.050  0.118  0.822  0.080  0.006  0.074 
  Net Capital Account (0.098) * (0.216) (0.460) (0.024) (0.062) (0.108) (0.361) (0.762) (1.211) (0.061) (0.145) (0.223)
Current Assets x -0.276  -0.134  -0.193  0.026  -0.102  0.046  0.204  -0.222  -0.174  0.280  0.313  0.188 
  Net Capital Account (0.114) ** (0.366) (0.480) (0.027) (0.074) (0.133) (0.403) (1.049) (1.610) (0.073) *** (0.205) (0.348)
Controls:
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.009  0.033  -0.013  0.004  0.002  0.023  0.095  -0.030  -0.031  0.000  0.000  -0.015 
        (0.007) (0.014) ** (0.018) (0.002) ** (0.004) (0.006) *** (0.024) *** (0.035) (0.056) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012)
Leverage -0.019  -0.042  -0.006  0.002  0.006  0.004  -0.100  0.007  0.103  -0.013  -0.006  -0.007 
        (0.005) *** (0.009) *** (0.017) (0.001) (0.002) ** (0.004) (0.018) *** (0.026) (0.042) ** (0.004) *** (0.005) (0.008)
Current Assets -0.026  0.020  -0.031  -0.001  0.002  0.019  0.117  -0.035  -0.015  -0.010  0.011  -0.009 
        (0.008) *** (0.018) (0.014) ** (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) *** (0.025) *** (0.037) (0.048) (0.005) ** (0.007) (0.010)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.262  0.305  0.257  0.133  0.251  0.237  0.291  0.523  0.501  -0.043  -0.090  -0.106 
(0.032) *** (0.053) *** (0.050) *** (0.019) *** (0.057) *** (0.046) *** (0.009) *** (0.015) *** (0.017) *** (0.018) ** (0.028) *** (0.031) ***
                                                                                          
Panel B: Dependent Variables from the Following Year
Interactions with Capital Flows:
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.028  0.603  2.947  0.005  -0.053  0.377  0.436  -0.186  3.580  -0.022  -0.034  -1.180 
  Net Capital Account (0.144) (0.529) (2.327) (0.028) (0.101) (0.221) * (0.389) (0.855) (1.881) * (0.080) (0.362) (0.536) **
Leverage x 0.323  -0.785  -0.774  0.023  0.092  -0.407  0.078  0.084  -1.561  0.132  0.029  0.672 
  Net Capital Account (0.104) *** (0.407) * (1.378) (0.025) (0.068) (0.165) ** (0.329) (0.607) (1.252) (0.073) * (0.253) (0.404) *
Current Assets x -0.328  0.204  -0.314  0.001  -0.039  0.137  0.082  -0.349  3.070  0.148  0.665  -0.667 
  Net Capital Account (0.123) *** (0.548) (1.645) (0.029) (0.084) (0.175) (0.377) (0.860) (1.710) * (0.079) * (0.285) ** (0.476)
Controls:
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.027  0.018  -0.026  0.001  -0.010  0.015  0.050  -0.043  -0.020  0.001  -0.002  -0.024 
        (0.010) *** (0.023) (0.057) (0.002) (0.005) ** (0.006) ** (0.021) ** (0.031) (0.048) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016)
Leverage -0.019  -0.019  -0.084  0.003  0.009  0.005  -0.029  0.008  0.092  -0.007  -0.001  0.005 
        (0.007) *** (0.016) (0.056) (0.002) * (0.003) *** (0.005) (0.015) * (0.023) (0.035) *** (0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Current Assets -0.020  0.012  0.019  -0.002  -0.004  0.014  0.041  -0.041  0.014  -0.013  0.002  -0.012 
        (0.011) * (0.022) (0.053) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) *** (0.022) * (0.032) (0.042) (0.006) ** (0.011) (0.013)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.297  0.408  0.732  0.151  0.154  0.233  0.370  0.523  0.522  -0.040  -0.075  -0.029 
(0.033) *** (0.068) *** (0.437) * (0.021) *** (0.040) *** (0.050) *** (0.010) *** (0.015) *** (0.016) *** (0.023) * (0.041) * (0.036)
Notes: Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column.
Estimates of the eﬀect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also included in each regression are indicator variables
for each country-year cell. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Net
short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current liabilities and current assets. Firm-level independent variables
are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total ﬁrm assets. The macroeconomic variable (net
capital account) is from the current period, but normalized by lagged GDP. The accounting data are from the Worldscope
database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see
Section II.
31Table 5: Alternative Estimators
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Panel A: OLS, Gauss-Markov standard errors
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.051  0.010  0.053  0.044  -0.064  0.261  0.001  -0.031 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.216) (0.025) ** (0.028) (0.378) (0.346) (0.058) (0.071)
Panel B: OLS, Huber-White standard errors
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.051  0.010  0.053  0.044  -0.064  0.261  0.001  -0.031 
  Net Capital Account (0.106) (0.162) (0.025) ** (0.026) * (0.387) (0.379) (0.058) (0.068)
Panel C: OLS, errors clustered on country x year
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.051  0.010  0.053  0.044  -0.064  0.261  0.001  -0.031 
  Net Capital Account (0.107) (0.163) (0.026) ** (0.023) * (0.501) (0.563) (0.052) (0.063)
Panel D: OLS, errors clustered by firm
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.051  0.010  0.053  0.044  -0.064  0.261  0.001  -0.031 
  Net Capital Account (0.120) (0.186) (0.026) ** (0.026) * (0.494) (0.469) (0.064) (0.066)
Panel E: OLS with lagged dependent variable
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.014  0.075  0.046  0.007  -0.042  0.302  0.035  -0.039 
  Net Capital Account (0.093) (0.134) (0.025) * (0.026) (0.346) (0.326) (0.064) (0.072)
Panel F: Matching estimator using 10th-order polynomials in the accounting variables
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.024  0.069  0.009  0.014  -0.217  0.121  0.041  0.037 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.173) (0.025) (0.029) (0.397) (0.383) (0.061) (0.069)
Panel G: Firm fixed effects, Huber-White standard errors
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.343  -0.323  0.056  0.013  -0.337  0.250  -0.105  -0.114 
  Net Capital Account (0.143) ** (0.231) (0.028) ** (0.029) (0.394) (0.396) (0.074) (0.090)
Panel H: Matching with firm fixed effects and Huber-White standard errors
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.190  -0.190  0.043  0.000  -0.132  0.327  0.055  0.020 
  Net Capital Account (0.149) (0.255) (0.030) (0.032) (0.420) (0.421) (0.079) (0.091)
Panel I: Firm fixed effects, AR(1) error
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.161  0.125  0.041  -0.001  -0.029  0.182  -0.069  -0.125 
  Net Capital Account (0.129) (0.231) (0.030) (0.033) (0.422) (0.416) (0.073) (0.089)
Estimated AR(1) Coefficient 0.205  0.289  0.128  0.117  0.311  0.289  0.029  0.037 
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets > 0
Notes: Each panel presents the results from a diﬀerent estimator. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column.
Estimates of the eﬀect of net short-term exposure times the net capital account are listed in each cell. Independent variables
in each regression are as in Table 3, Column 2, however reporting of the rest of the estimates is supressed. A single asterisk
denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies
because of data availability. Net short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current liabilities and current assets.
Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total ﬁrm assets. The
macroeconomic variable (net capital account) is from the current period, but normalized by lagged GDP. The accounting data
are from the Worldscope database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources
and descriptions, see Section II.
32Table 6: Alternative Normalizations
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Panel A: Normalized by Lagged Assets
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.016  0.113  0.046  * 0.006  -0.063  0.359  0.036  -0.012 
  Net Capital Account (0.093) (0.129) (0.026) (0.026) (0.348) (0.328) (0.064) (0.067)
Leverage x  0.080  0.174  * 0.005  0.019  0.274  -0.025  0.077  0.115  **
  Net Capital Account (0.084) (0.098) (0.022) (0.022) (0.304) (0.281) (0.054) (0.058)
Current Assets x  -0.179  * -0.256  ** 0.024  0.001  -0.056  -0.003  0.301  *** 0.185  ***
  Net Capital Account (0.096) (0.117) (0.024) (0.026) (0.350) (0.329) (0.064) (0.068)
Panel B: Normalized by Lagged Total Market Value
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.072  -0.086  0.074  ** 0.000  -0.214  0.931  ** 0.051  0.044 
  Net Capital Account (0.085) (0.093) (0.033) (0.032) (0.447) (0.445) (0.076) (0.080)
Leverage x  0.219  *** 0.296  *** 0.012  0.045  0.388  * -0.225  0.046  0.103  *
  Net Capital Account (0.073) (0.075) (0.027) (0.027) (0.359) (0.342) (0.055) (0.057)
Current Assets x  -0.091  -0.186  ** 0.059  * -0.005  -0.433  0.452  0.219  *** 0.114 
  Net Capital Account (0.081) (0.086) (0.030) (0.031) (0.425) (0.413) (0.077) (0.080)
Panel C:  Normalized by Lagged Stock
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.309  0.208  0.028  0.038  0.062  0.013 
  Net Capital Account (0.285) (0.396) (0.024) (0.040) (0.076) (0.074)
Leverage x  0.009  0.070  -0.010  -0.022  -0.019  0.008 
  Net Capital Account (0.159) (0.277) (0.016) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033)
Current Assets x  0.105  0.102  0.023  0.032  0.063  0.019 
  Net Capital Account (0.287) (0.402) (0.023) (0.037) (0.077) (0.073)
Panel D:  Normalized by Lagged Total Assets (RHS) and Lagged Stock (LHS)
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.824  -0.966  0.430  ** 0.208  -0.021  0.381  -1.057  -3.233 
  Net Capital Account (0.685) (1.156) (0.199) (0.216) (0.349) (0.329) (1.763) (2.226)
Leverage x  1.017  1.115  -0.137  0.032  0.271  -0.052  0.214  2.781 
  Net Capital Account (0.708) (0.913) (0.158) (0.171) (0.305) (0.281) (1.897) (2.112)
Current Assets x  -0.266  -1.094  0.292  0.200  -0.023  0.000  -1.354  -2.362 
  Net Capital Account (0.950) (1.523) (0.179) (0.205) (0.351) (0.329) (1.529) (2.107)
Panel E: Normalized by Lagged Total Market Value (RHS) and Lagged Stock (LHS)
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.170  0.621  0.363  * 0.172  -0.147  0.579  -1.331  -3.621 
  Net Capital Account (0.880) (1.120) (0.206) (0.237) (0.443) (0.423) (1.609) (2.848)
Leverage x  -0.565  -0.061  -0.171  0.008  0.413  -0.322  0.056  3.118 
  Net Capital Account (0.604) (0.867) (0.162) (0.208) (0.356) (0.333) (1.822) (2.537)
Current Assets x  0.694  0.910  0.376  ** 0.330  * -0.358  0.316  -0.599  -3.593 
  Net Capital Account (0.518) (1.032) (0.177) (0.198) (0.421) (0.399) (1.438) (2.674)
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets > 0
Notes: Each panel presents the results from a diﬀerent speciﬁcation. The dependent variables are as indicated above each
column. Each Panel/Column contains the results from a separate regression. Estimates of the interactions of accounting
variables with the net capital account are listed in each cell. Independent variables in each regression are as in Table 3, Column
2, however reporting of the rest of the estimates is supressed. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% level of
conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Net short-term exposure is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current liabilities and current assets. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values.
Accounting variables are scaled as indicated in the Panel headings. The macroeconomic variable (net capital account) is from
the current period, but normalized by lagged GDP. The accounting data are from the Worldscope database, as described in the
text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section II.
33Table 7: Alternative Macro Variables
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Disposal of Fixed Assets Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Panel A: Net Capital Account
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.014  0.075  0.046  0.007  -0.042  0.302  0.035  -0.039 
  Net Capital Account (NCA) (0.093) (0.134) (0.025) ** (0.026) (0.346) (0.326) (0.064) (0.072)
Panel B: Net Capital Account Less Foreign Direct Investment
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.004  0.046  0.040  0.012  0.096  0.155  0.033  -0.064 
  Net Capital Account less FDI (0.080) (0.105) (0.025) (0.025) (0.341) (0.327) (0.059) (0.068)
Panel C: Change in Domestic Private Credit
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.017  -0.027  0.016  -0.005  0.308  0.274  -0.029  -0.040 
  Change in Domestic Credit (0.044) (0.051) (0.013) (0.013) (0.190) (0.185) (0.034) (0.038)
Panel D: Change in Domestic Private Credit and Net Capital Account
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.044  0.134  0.048  0.012  -0.507  0.010  0.091  -0.013 
  Change in Domestic Credit (0.113) (0.177) (0.033) (0.035) (0.394) (0.356) (0.077) (0.091)
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.029 -0.064 0.002 -0.008 0.449 0.270 -0.054 -0.027
  Net Capital Account (0.053) (0.073) (0.017) (0.018) (0.216) ** (0.203) (0.041) (0.047)
Panel E: Net Capital Account, Standardized Within Country
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.002  0.014  0.004  0.000  0.016  0.056  0.006  -0.004 
  Net Capital Account (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) *** (0.002) (0.019) (0.018) *** (0.004) (0.005)
Panel F: Net Capital Account Less FDI, Standardized Within Country
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.002  0.017  0.003  0.001  0.008  0.035  0.008  -0.005 
  Net Capital Account less FDI (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) * (0.002) (0.020) (0.019) * (0.004) * (0.005)
Panel G: Change in Domestic Private Credit, Standardized Within Country
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.003  -0.008  0.002  -0.001  0.024  0.040  -0.002  -0.004 
  Change in Domestic Credit (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.017) ** (0.004) (0.004)
Panel H: Country EMBI Spread
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.145  0.057  -0.009  0.005  -0.049  0.176  -0.008  0.028 
EMBI spread (0.064) ** (0.067) (0.011) (0.017) (0.142) (0.128) (0.021) (0.049)
Panel I: Aggregate EMBI Spread
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.046  -0.058  0.005  0.004  -0.048  -0.094  0.000  0.035 
EMBI spread (0.038) (0.049) (0.009) (0.009) (0.123) (0.117) (0.025) (0.024)
Disposal of Fixed Assets 
> 0
Note: Table continues on next page.
34Table 7 (Continued): Alternative Macro Variables
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Disposal of Fixed Assets Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Panel J: Low Capital Inflow
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.001  -0.018  -0.109  -0.008  0.006 
  I( NCA <  Z ) (0.010) (0.019) (0.003) ** (0.004) (0.034) (0.031) *** (0.007) (0.009)
Z=median NCA 1985-02
Panel K: Net Capital Account: Low vs High
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.048  0.463  0.046  -0.040  0.418  0.996  0.100  -0.047 
  Net Capital Account (0.216) (0.379) (0.050) (0.053) (0.623) (0.547) * (0.127) (0.151)
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.083  -0.652  0.009  0.077  -0.727  -1.484  -0.123  0.020 
 NCA x  I( NCA<  Z ) (0.314) (0.577) (0.085) (0.098) (0.948) (0.827) * (0.191) (0.227)
Panel L: Crisis Periods
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.006  -0.010  -0.004  -0.004  -0.034  -0.060  -0.011  0.008 
  I( NCA < X ) (0.009) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.037) (0.034) * (0.008) (0.009)
Panel M: Net Capital Account, Normal versus Crisis
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.141  0.152  0.095  -0.028  0.163  0.781  0.002  0.012 
  Net Capital Account (0.156) (0.256) (0.036) *** (0.042) (0.521) (0.455) * (0.099) (0.123)
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.289  -0.077  -0.085  0.059  -0.356  -1.300  0.061  -0.096 
NCA x  I( NCA < X ) (0.214) (0.336) (0.062) (0.077) (0.847) (0.743) * (0.154) (0.184)
Disposal of Fixed Assets 
> 0
X=(mean NCA 1985-02) - (stdev NCA 1985-02)
Notes: Each panel presents the results using a diﬀerent measure of capital ﬂows. Each cell reports the results of an OLS
regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the eﬀect of net short-term exposure
times the indicated macro variable are listed in each cell. Independent variables in each regression are as in Table 3, Column
2, however reporting of the rest of the estimates is supressed. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% level
of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The macroeconomic variables are from the current period. Net capital account and
domestic credit are normalized by lagged GDP. Macro variables for Panel E-G are further normalized by country to zero mean
and unit standard deviation. The accounting data are from the Worldscope database, as described in the text. Macro data are
drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section II.
35Table 8: Marked Reversals of Capital Flows, 1994–1999












Notes: Country-year-speciﬁc episodes of capital-account reversals are denoted with an ‘X’. Source: Calvo et al (2004) and
authors’ calculations.
36Table 9: Sudden Stop Episodes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
(t) (t) (t+1) (t+1) (t+2) (t+2) (t) (t) (t+1) (t+1) (t+2) (t+2)
Independent Variables:
Panel A: Full Sample
Interactions
-0.014  -0.021  -0.024  0.032  -0.011  0.046  -0.013  -0.025  0.034  -0.025  0.037  -0.002 
(0.026) (0.048) (0.024) (0.039) (0.024) (0.039) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) ** (0.023) (0.015) ** (0.023)
Current Assets x Post 0.008  0.067  0.064  -0.002  -0.096  -0.043 
(0.044) (0.035) * (0.034) * (0.022) (0.020) *** (0.021) **
Leverage x Post 0.022  -0.031  -0.040  0.023  0.000  0.023 
(0.035) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) *
Controls
Post -0.009  -0.025  -0.058  -0.066  -0.067  -0.069  0.004  -0.008  -0.019  0.017  -0.006  -0.003 
(0.006) (0.016) (0.005) *** (0.012) *** (0.005) *** (0.014) *** (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) *** (0.005) *** (0.003) ** (0.005)
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.052  -0.031  0.048  -0.032  0.043  -0.027  -0.011  -0.002  -0.012  -0.006  -0.010  0.003 
(0.021) ** (0.035) (0.021) ** (0.035) (0.021) ** (0.034) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
 
Current Assets -0.127  -0.122  -0.111  0.010  0.008  0.012 
(0.032) *** (0.031) *** (0.031) *** (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Leverage 0.014  0.013  0.005  -0.005  -0.003  -0.010 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Panel B: Asia
Interactions
-0.030  -0.026  -0.037  0.052  -0.049  0.055  -0.023  -0.020  0.039  -0.026  0.045  0.006 
(0.032) (0.059) (0.030) (0.048) (0.028) * (0.045) (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) * (0.028) (0.020) ** (0.027)
Current Assets x Post 0.020  0.128  0.154  0.015  -0.114  -0.045 
(0.057) (0.044) *** (0.041) *** (0.029) (0.026) *** (0.027) *
Leverage x Post 0.014  -0.034  -0.033  0.011  0.000  0.027 
(0.042) (0.030) (0.028) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) **
Controls
Post -0.014  -0.030  -0.068  -0.101  -0.085  -0.127  0.002  -0.010  -0.028  0.018  -0.011  -0.009 
(0.008) * (0.022) (0.006) *** (0.016) *** (0.006) *** (0.015) *** (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) *** (0.008) ** (0.003) *** (0.008)
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.077  -0.037  0.068  -0.047  0.066  -0.046  -0.007  -0.004  -0.012  -0.010  -0.009  0.000 
(0.027) *** (0.044) (0.027) ** (0.044) (0.027) ** (0.043) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022)
Current Assets -0.169  -0.172  -0.171  0.002  0.002  0.007 
(0.041) *** (0.040) *** (0.040) *** (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Leverage 0.035  0.033  0.026  -0.002  -0.003  -0.009 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Panel C: Latin America
Interactions
-0.013  -0.002  -0.002  0.011  0.103  0.201  -0.004  -0.055  0.015  -0.004  0.009  -0.010 
(0.041) (0.088) (0.031) (0.063) (0.051) ** (0.112) * (0.019) (0.036) (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) (0.039)
Current Assets x Post 0.059  0.017  0.069  -0.020  -0.014  -0.018 
(0.064) (0.053) (0.067) (0.033) (0.026) (0.035)
Leverage x Post 0.049  -0.007  -0.119  0.071  0.018  0.012 
(0.109) (0.051) (0.072) (0.026) *** (0.018) (0.023)
Controls
Post 0.002  -0.038  -0.034  -0.035  -0.020  0.016  0.009  -0.019  0.001  -0.004  0.001  0.000 
(0.012) (0.049) (0.008) *** (0.022) (0.012) * (0.033) (0.003) *** (0.009) ** (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.002  0.029  0.006  0.031  -0.001  0.034  -0.014  -0.001  -0.015  -0.008  -0.015  -0.002 
(0.025) (0.050) (0.024) (0.050) (0.024) (0.050) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.021)
Current Assets -0.019  -0.016  -0.011  0.010  0.004  0.012 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Leverage -0.071  -0.068  -0.079  -0.012  -0.008  -0.011 
(0.041) * (0.041) * (0.041) * (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Net Short-Term Exposure x 
Post
Net Short-Term Exposure x 
Post
Net Short-Term Exposure x 
Post
Note: Table continues on next page.
37Table 9 (Continued): Sudden Stop Episodes
Dependent Variables:
Disposal of Fixed Assets Disposal of Fixed Assets > 0
(t) (t) (t+1) (t+1) (t+2) (t+2) (t) (t) (t+1) (t+1) (t+2) (t+2)
Independent Variables:
Panel D: Full Sample
Interactions
0.005  -0.005  0.007  -0.004  0.007  -0.002  -0.027  -0.069  -0.066  -0.046  0.001  0.015 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.077) (0.122) (0.076) (0.121) (0.078) (0.123)
Current Assets x Post -0.010  -0.009  -0.007  -0.051  0.043  -0.011 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.111) (0.115) (0.113)
Leverage x Post 0.008  0.011  0.009  0.021  0.014  -0.038 
(0.005) (0.005) ** (0.006) (0.072) (0.074) (0.075)
Controls
Post 0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.002  -0.019  -0.012  -0.042  -0.066  -0.058  -0.033 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.016) (0.042) (0.016) ** (0.043) (0.017) *** (0.043)
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.002  0.008  0.001  0.008  0.001  0.008  0.061  0.113  0.064  0.107  0.067  0.087 
(0.003) (0.004) * (0.003) (0.004) * (0.003) (0.004) * (0.055) (0.084) (0.055) (0.085) (0.056) (0.086)
 
Current Assets 0.007  0.008  0.008  0.101  0.090  0.079 
(0.004) (0.004) * (0.004) ** (0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Leverage -0.003  -0.004  -0.005  0.018  0.023  0.055 
(0.002) (0.003) * (0.002) ** (0.053) (0.053) (0.056)
Panel E: Asia
Interactions
0.007  -0.007  0.011  -0.004  0.009  0.002  0.004  -0.038  -0.015  -0.034  0.051  0.053 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) ** (0.008) (0.005) * (0.008) (0.087) (0.130) (0.083) (0.128) (0.087) (0.130)
Current Assets x Post -0.016  -0.017  -0.007  -0.059  -0.025  -0.088 
(0.008) * (0.007) ** (0.008) (0.127) (0.132) (0.132)
Leverage x Post 0.008  0.011  0.005  0.017  0.010  -0.098 
(0.006) (0.006) ** (0.005) (0.071) (0.075) (0.082)
Controls
Post 0.002  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.016  -0.014  -0.010  -0.026  0.068 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018) (0.051) (0.018) (0.053) (0.019) (0.053)
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.001  0.007  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.007  0.047  0.129  0.048  0.127  0.064  0.114 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.056) (0.081) (0.056) (0.082) (0.056) (0.086)
Current Assets 0.008  0.008  0.008  0.156  0.157  0.152 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.087) * (0.087) * (0.090) *
Leverage -0.003  -0.005  -0.005  0.019  0.028  0.076 
(0.003) (0.003) * (0.003) * (0.051) (0.053) (0.062)
Panel F: Latin America
Interactions
-0.002  -0.007  -0.010  -0.007  -0.005  -0.039  -0.224  -0.362  -0.256  -0.209  -0.249  -0.474 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.023) * (0.167) (0.360) (0.169) (0.362) (0.173) (0.382)
Current Assets x Post -0.001  0.013  -0.023  -0.179  0.081  -0.140 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.022) (0.307) (0.304) (0.325)
Leverage x Post 0.009  0.009  0.039  0.051  0.011  0.244 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.027) (0.258) (0.258) (0.269)
Controls
Post -0.001  -0.004  -0.001  -0.009  0.000  -0.012  -0.062  -0.036  -0.100  -0.127  -0.129  -0.207 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.035) * (0.094) (0.035) *** (0.097) (0.036) *** (0.096) **
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.005  0.011  0.005  0.012  0.004  0.014  0.190  0.154  0.192  0.156  0.165  0.165 
(0.003) * (0.007) * (0.003) * (0.007) * (0.003) (0.007) ** (0.129) (0.274) (0.130) (0.281) (0.134) (0.286)
Current Assets 0.008  0.008  0.012  -0.010  -0.025  0.003 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) ** (0.224) (0.228) (0.229)
Leverage -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  0.052  0.036  0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.181) (0.183) (0.181)
Net Short-Term Exposure x 
Post
Net Short-Term Exposure x 
Post
Net Short-Term Exposure x 
Post
Notes: Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. Period t is the capital reversal episode, as deﬁned in the text. All
regressions include observations from two periods: t-1 and either t, t+1 or t+2. The post dummy corresponds to periods t, t+1
or t+2. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the eﬀect of the independent variables are
listed in each row. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parenthesis. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. Net short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current
liabilities and current assets. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by
the lag of total ﬁrm assets. The accounting data are from the Worldscope database, as described in the text. Macro data are
drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section II.
38Table 10: Diﬀerential Access to Capital
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables: Panel A: Interaction with ADR
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.054  0.004  0.053  0.044  -0.029  0.307  0.001  -0.030 
  Net Capital Account (0.107) (0.162) (0.025) ** (0.026) * (0.388) (0.379) (0.058) (0.068)
Dummy if firm has ADR x -0.067  -0.128  -0.006  0.010  -0.241  0.126  0.016  0.025 
  Net Capital Account (0.057) (0.077) * (0.013) (0.026) (0.225) (0.207) (0.029) (0.034)
Panel B: Interaction with Listed on Stock Exchange
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.053  0.005  0.054  0.045  -0.039  0.283  0.002  -0.030 
  Net Capital Account (0.106) (0.162) (0.025) ** (0.026) * (0.387) (0.379) (0.058) (0.068)
Dummy if listed on exchange x 0.052  -0.337  -0.016  -0.023  0.855  1.144  0.107  0.005 
  Net Capital Account (0.294) (0.455) (0.018) (0.027) (0.569) (0.523) ** (0.113) (0.135)
Panel C: Interaction with Size
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.116  -0.150  0.071  0.051  -0.067  0.487  -0.013  -0.057 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.180) (0.025) *** (0.028) * (0.403) (0.384) (0.061) (0.073)
Log Total Assets x -0.026  -0.063  0.006  0.002  0.076  0.140  -0.006  -0.011 
  Net Capital Account (0.013) ** (0.023) *** (0.003) ** (0.003) (0.039) ** (0.037) *** (0.006) (0.008)
Panel D: Industry-Specific Sensitivities to Capital Flows
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.003  0.088  0.048  0.031  -0.159  0.107  0.012  -0.023 
  Net Capital Account (0.106) (0.170) (0.025) * (0.027) (0.389) (0.385) (0.059) (0.069)
Dummies for 1-digit SIC x Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Net Capital Account
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets > 0
Notes: Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column.
Estimates of the eﬀect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also included in each regression are indicator variables
for each country-year cell. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Net
short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current liabilities and current assets. Firm-level independent variables
are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total ﬁrm assets. The macroeconomic variable (net
capital account) is from the current period, but normalized by lagged GDP. The accounting data are from the Worldscope
database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see
Section II.
39Table 11: Competitiveness Controls
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables: Panel A: Controling for Profitability
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.182  -0.109  0.056  0.040  -0.330  -0.020  -0.059  -0.084 
  Net Capital Account (0.112) (0.221) (0.025) ** (0.028) (0.384) (0.360) (0.058) (0.071)
EBITDA 0.147  0.187  0.000  0.001  0.088  0.110  0.071  0.047 
(0.006) *** (0.012) *** (0.001) (0.002) (0.019) *** (0.018) *** (0.003) *** (0.004) ***
Panel B:  Controls x Dlog(rer) 
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.079  -0.014  0.055  0.041  -0.049  0.133  -0.014  -0.023 
  Net Capital Account (0.114) (0.222) (0.026) ** (0.028) (0.389) (0.356) (0.060) (0.073)
Panel C:  SIC x Dlog(rer) interactions
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.018  0.030  0.056  0.031  -0.316  0.035  0.000  -0.036 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.217) (0.025) ** (0.028) (0.380) (0.349) (0.058) (0.071)
Panel D:  Dummy Export  x Dlog(rer) interactions
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.029  0.019  0.061  0.040  -0.063  0.264  0.010  -0.038 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.216) (0.025) ** (0.028) (0.379) (0.347) (0.058) (0.071)
Panel E: SIC x Dlog(rer) interactions & Dummy Export  x Dlog(rer) interactions
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.160  -0.071  0.054  0.035  -0.360  -0.063  -0.030  -0.107 
  Net Capital Account (0.113) (0.236) (0.027) ** (0.030) (0.405) (0.378) (0.062) (0.076)
Panel F: Year x Country x SIC fixed effects
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.049  0.047  0.052  0.035  -0.223  0.054  0.024  -0.026 
  Net Capital Account (0.112) (0.229) (0.026) ** (0.029) (0.399) (0.364) (0.061) (0.075)
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets > 0
Notes: Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column.
Estimates of the eﬀect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also included in each regression are indicator variables
for each country-year cell. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Net
short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current liabilities and current assets. Firm-level independent variables
are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total ﬁrm assets. The macroeconomic variables (net
capital account and log change in the real exchange rate) are from the current period. Net capital account is normalized by
lagged GDP. The real exchange rate is the ratio of the local currency price of the US$ to the domestic CPI. The accounting
data are from the Worldscope database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed
sources and descriptions, see Section II.
40Table 12: Controls for Corporate Aﬃliations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Panel A: Baseline for Asia
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.025  0.028  0.042  0.009  0.144  0.436  0.028  -0.022 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.144) (0.028) (0.028) (0.411) (0.389) (0.074) (0.080)
Panel B: Asia Sample with Controls for Affiliations
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.026  0.014  0.045  0.010  0.174  0.432  0.022  -0.028 
  Net Capital Account (0.111) (0.144) (0.028) (0.028) (0.411) (0.389) (0.074) (0.080)
Ownership (Widely-Held) x 0.100  0.077  -0.005  0.008  -0.068  0.109  -0.027  -0.020 
  Net Capital Account (0.098) (0.108) (0.011) (0.012) (0.222) (0.209) (0.038) (0.040)
Ownership (Bank) x 0.014  -0.038  0.064  0.025  0.143  0.486  -0.007  -0.027 
  Net Capital Account (0.090) (0.098) (0.052) (0.018) (0.430) (0.397) (0.053) (0.072)
Ownership (Family) x 0.017  * -0.051  0.010  0.017  -0.008  -0.233  ** 0.009  -0.014 
  Net Capital Account (0.037) (0.047) (0.008) (0.009) (0.110) (0.105) (0.022) (0.024)
Ownership (Government) x -0.019  -0.056  -0.001  -0.004  0.129  -0.260  -0.098  *** -0.005 
  Net Capital Account (0.057) (0.082) (0.008) (0.010) (0.203) (0.212) (0.034) (0.047)
Panel C: Baseline for Latin American Sample
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.318  0.603  -0.121  -0.053  0.377  -0.051  -0.049  -0.034 
  Net Capital Account (0.335) (0.529) (0.089) (0.101) (1.017) (0.851) (0.221) (0.362)
Panel D: Latin American Sample with Controls for Affiliations
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.312  0.662  -0.126  -0.068  0.195  -0.078  -0.065  -0.060 
  Net Capital Account (0.332) (0.535) (0.089) (0.100) (1.021) (0.867) (0.220) (0.361)
Property (Subsidiary) x -0.001  0.274  -0.038  ** -0.018  -0.646  -0.178  -0.111  -0.041 
  Net Capital Account (0.139) (0.215) (0.019) (0.017) (0.427) (0.353) (0.073) (0.090)
Property (Affiliate) x -0.492  * -0.085  -0.047  -0.047  -2.532  *** -0.626  -0.111  0.107 
  Net Capital Account (0.284) (0.341) (0.034) (0.030) (0.874) (0.753) (0.130) (0.111)
 Property (Other) x 0.095  0.272  * -0.043  ** -0.049  ** -0.620  * 0.034  -0.058  -0.079 
  Net Capital Account (0.113) (0.162) (0.019) (0.023) (0.371) (0.310) (0.050) (0.066)
Capital 
Expenditures
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets




Notes: Each Panel/column presents the results from a diﬀerent speciﬁcation. The dependent variables (and their timing) are
as indicated above each column. Estimates of the eﬀect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Independent
variables in each regression are as in Table 3, Column 2, except for the additional ownership variables. (Reporting of the rest
of the estimates is suppressed.) A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%;
triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Net short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between current liabilities and current assets. Firm-level accounting variables are once-lagged values and are normalized by
lagged assets. The ownership variables, deﬁned in the text, are dummies interacted with the net-capital account. (The ﬁrst-
order eﬀects are estimated, but not reported.) The macroeconomic variable (net capital account) is from the current period, but
normalized by lagged GDP. The accounting data are from the Worldscope database, as described in the text. The ownership
data for East Asian corporations are from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), while the Latin-American data are from
Corporate Aﬃliations. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section II.
41Table 13: Financing and Short-Term Exposure
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Dependent Variables:
Independent Variables Total Debt Interest Payments Gross New Debt Net New Debt
and Regression Statistics:
Panel A: Dependent Variables from the Current Year
Interactions with Capital Flows:
Net Short-Term Exposure x -2.058  -0.131  -0.327  -0.133  -0.087  -0.152  0.371  0.268  0.580  -0.108  -0.112  -0.048 
  Net Capital Account (0.303) *** (0.387) (0.417) (0.033) *** (0.057) (0.055) *** (0.085) *** (0.192) (0.198) *** (0.100) (0.213) (0.234)
Leverage x -0.345  -0.671  0.072  -0.004  0.179  -0.162  -0.071  -0.146 
  Net Capital Account (0.293) (0.293) ** (0.050) (0.044) (0.182) (0.185) (0.181) (0.189)
Current Assets x 0.756 0.585  -0.085  -0.108  0.136  0.528  0.000  0.129 
  Net Capital Account -0.317 ** (0.336) * (0.048) * (0.045) ** (0.183) (0.181) *** (0.182) (0.187)
Controls:
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.593  0.032  0.018  0.050  0.001  -0.006  0.022  -0.049  -0.016  -0.022  -0.008  -0.004 
        (0.022) *** (0.029) (0.032) (0.002) *** (0.004) (0.004) * (0.006) *** (0.011) *** (0.012) (0.007) *** (0.013) (0.015)
Leverage 0.852  0.757  0.073  0.035  0.071  0.031  -0.022  -0.031 
        (0.024) *** (0.032) *** (0.003) *** (0.004) *** (0.010) *** (0.009) *** (0.011) * (0.013) **
Current Assets 0.033 0.023  -0.004  -0.006  -0.067  -0.032  -0.004  0.000 
        -0.023 (0.026) (0.003) (0.003) ** (0.011) *** (0.011) *** (0.011) (0.012)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.086  0.558  0.202  0.105 
(0.017) *** (0.022) *** (0.019) *** (0.013) ***
Regression Statistics:
N  19190 19185 15497 18643 18634 14883 14896 14887 11860 15402 15393 12409
0.34 0.58 0.59 0.38 0.48 0.62 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.14
Panel B: Dependent Variables from the Following Year
Interactions with Capital Flows:
Net Short-Term Exposure x -1.880  -1.306  -2.058  -0.072  -0.017  -0.066  0.409  0.279  0.353  0.107  -0.142  -0.054 
  Net Capital Account (0.405) *** (0.535) ** (0.485) *** (0.038) * (0.059) (0.048) (0.106) *** (0.220) (0.196) * (0.105) (0.198) (0.188)
Leverage x 1.133  0.381  0.078  0.012  0.353  0.175  0.377  0.334 
  Net Capital Account (0.401) *** (0.353) (0.047) * (0.032) (0.204) * (0.169) (0.170) ** (0.134) **
Current Assets x -0.150 -1.251  -0.001  -0.026  0.244  0.290  -0.137  -0.111 
  Net Capital Account -0.480 (0.442) *** (0.050) (0.040) (0.199) (0.187) (0.176) (0.173)
Controls:
Net Short-Term Exposure 0.498  0.058  0.065  0.041  0.001  -0.001  0.012  -0.059  -0.022  -0.020  -0.003  0.010 
        (0.029) *** (0.038) (0.034) * (0.003) *** (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.017) *** (0.014) (0.009) ** (0.015) (0.014)
Leverage 0.738  0.301  0.066  0.025  0.081  0.039  -0.011  -0.019 
        (0.029) *** (0.038) *** (0.004) *** (0.003) *** (0.014) *** (0.012) *** (0.011) (0.010) **
Current Assets 0.076 0.057  -0.001  0.001  -0.059  -0.031  0.021  0.019 
        -0.033 ** (0.030) * (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) *** (0.015) ** (0.012) * (0.013)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.518  0.557  0.252  0.122 
(0.028) *** (0.021) *** (0.033) *** (0.025) ***
Regression Statistics:
N  15564 15557 12452 15116 15110 11951 12403 12398 10079 12782 12777 10502
0.20 0.30 0.49 0.33 0.39 0.57 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.13
R2
R2
Notes: Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column.
Estimates of the eﬀect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also included in each regression are indicator variables
for each country-year cell. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance
at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Net
short-term exposure is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current liabilities and current assets. Firm-level independent variables
are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total ﬁrm assets. The macroeconomic variable (net
capital account) s from the current period, but normalized by lagged GDP. The accounting data are from the Worldscope
database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see
Section II.
42Table 14: Income and Short-Term Exposure
Estimated Coefficient on
Net Short-Term Exposure x
Net Capital Account
Period for Dependent Variable: (t) (t+1)
Dependent Variable:
Panel A: Full Sample
Income Variables
1. Operating Income 0.047  0.009 
(0.097) (0.091)
2. Non Operating Income 0.602  0.112 
(0.229) *** (0.155)
2.1 Income from investments -0.031  -0.008 
(0.023) (0.023)
2.2 Accrued Interest Cost -0.152  -0.066 
(0.055) *** (0.048)
2.3 Other Non Operating Income 0.338  0.126 
(0.154) ** (0.089)
3. Net Income 0.859  0.092 
(0.285) *** (0.188)
Cash Flow Variables
Cash flow from Operations 0.096  -0.032 
(0.100) (0.096)
Earnings before interest, taxes and amortizations 0.786  -0.003 
(0.268) *** (0.182)
Panel B: Subsample With Detailed Data
Other Non Operating Income 0.245  0.208 
(0.107) ** (0.107) **
Gains from sale of assets 0.062  0.078 
(0.033) * (0.032) **
Notes: Each cell reports the results of the estimated coeﬃcient on (Net Short-Term Exposure × Net Capital Account) from
an OLS regression. Independent variables in each regression are as in Table 3, Column 3, however reporting of the rest of the
estimates is supressed. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% level of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The sample varies
across dependent variables because of data availability. Net capital account is from the current period, but normalized by lagged
GDP. The accounting data are from the Worldscope database. Deﬁnitions of the accounting variables are provided in the text.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Appendix: Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
This appendix describes our main variables and sources.
VII.A Sources and deﬁnitions for the ﬁrm-level data
Our main source of ﬁrm level data is the Worldscope Database. There are two main types of
ﬁrm level data: accounting variables, and non-accounting variables. The ﬁrst come directly from
ﬁrm Balance Sheets, Income Statements and Cash-Flow Statements. The second correspond to
additional information regarding ﬁrm ownership, and production structure. Examples of the latter
are whether a ﬁrm has a listed stock, where this stock is traded, and the sector where the ﬁrm
is operating. The only ﬁrm level variables not from Worldscope are the ADR dummy, which
identiﬁes whether the ﬁrm trades shares in the form of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), and
the variables identifying ﬁrms as part of a conglomerate.
The codes correspond to the codes from Worldscope database. Unless speciﬁed otherwise all
accounting variables are scaled by lagged total assets (WS 02999).
Accounting Variables
Investment
• Capital Expenditures: This variable corresponds to the funds spent by the ﬁrm on ﬁxed assets
(WS 04601).
• Disposal of Fixed Assets: Sales of ﬁxed assets (WS 04351).
• Change in Inventories: This variable corresponds to the change in inventories (WS 02101)
between the current and previous year.
Main control variables
• Exposure: This variable is measured as the diﬀerence between lagged current liabilities (WS
03101) and lagged current assets.
• Leverage: Lagged total liabilities (WS 03351).
• Current Assets: Lagged current assets (WS 02201).
Financing variables
• Interest Accruals: Interest expenses on debt (WS 01251).
• Gross New Debt: This variable corresponds to new debt issuance. It includes both short-term
and long-term debt. It is constructed as long-term borrowings (WS 04401) plus net short
term borrowings (WS 04821).
• Net New Debt: This variable corresponds to debt issuance, net of debt repayments. It
includes both short-term and long-term debt. It is constructed as long-term borrowings (WS
04401) minus the reduction in long-term debt (WS 04701) plus net short term borrowings
(WS 04821).
45Income variables
• Operating Income: Income from ﬁrm’s main line of operations (WS 01250).
• Net Income: This variable correspond to net income after preferred dividends (WS 01706).
• Non Operating Income: Is the diﬀerence between Operating Income (WS 01250) and Net
Income (WS 01706).
• Income from Investments: This variable is a sub-category of Non Operating Income. It is the
sum of: Non Operating Interest Income (WS 01266), Pretax Equity Earnings (WS 01267)
and Equity in Earnings (WS 1503).
• Other Non Operating Income: This variable is a sub-category of Non Operating Income. It
is the sum of Other Income (WS 01262) and After Tax Other Income (WS 01540).
• Gains from Sales of Assets: This variable is a supplementary variable to the income statement.
It is included in Other Non Operating Income, and corresponds to accounting gains/losses
from the sale of assets (WS 01306).
• Cash Flow from operations (WS 04201).
• EBITDA: This variable correspond to the earnings before interest expense, income taxes and
depreciation (WS 18198).
Non-Accounting Variables
• ADR: This is a indicator variable that measures wether the ﬁrm’s stock is listed in a US stock
exchange in the form of American Depository Receipts. The variable was constructed using
information from the Bank of New York.
• Cross-listing: This is a indicator variable that takes on value 1 wether the ﬁrm’s stock is
traded in more than one stock exchange. It was constructed using (WS 20009)
• Listed on a stock exchange: This is a indicator variable that take the value 1 wether the ﬁrm
has a stock listed in a stock exchange (WS 20009).
• SIC code: Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation code (version 1987) (WS 07021)
• Export dummy: dummy if ﬁrm exported (WS 07161) in previous period.
Property Data
• For ﬁrms from East Asia, the source of data on ﬁrm ownership is Claessens, Djankov and
Lang (2000). The ﬁrst category is for widely held ﬁrms. The additional three categories are:
ﬁrms aﬃliated with banks, ﬁrms aﬃliated with families and ﬁrms aﬃliated with governments.
The omitted category is for those ﬁrms not classiﬁed in that study. Data refer to ownership
status in 1996.
• For Latin America, we build ownership variables using the June 2003 version of the Corporate
Aﬃliations Plus database (Lexis-Nexis, 2003). This database classiﬁes ﬁrms into subsidiaries,
aﬃliates and widely held corporations. The omitted category is for ﬁrms not appearing in
the Corporate Aﬃliations database.
46VII.B Sources and Deﬁnitions for the Macroeconomic Data
All the aggregate variables are based on data from the International Financial Statistics, (IMF,
2004a) with the exception of the Sudden Stop Dummy which comes from Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia.
(2004).
VII.B.1 Capital Flows
• Net Capital Inﬂows: Net ﬁnancial account (IFS 78bjd) expressed in previous period local
currency, scaled by lagged nominal GDP (IFS 99b). For previous period local currency
US Dollar Balance of Payments variables are multiplied by the once lagged period average
exchange rate (local currency × US Dollar).
• Capital Inﬂows net of FDI: This variable corresponds to Net Financial Account (IFS 78bjd)
net of Direct Investment Abroad (IFS 78bdd) and Direct Investment in Reporting Economy
(IFS 78bed), expressed in previous period local currency, scaled by lagged nominal GDP.
• Change in Credit to the Private Sector: This variable corresponds to the cpi-adjusted change
in bank credit to private sector (IFS 22d) scaled by nominal GDP.
VII.B.2 Alternative Measures of Capital Flows
• Low Capital Inﬂow (low): This is a indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the Net
Financial Account (IFS 78bjd) is below a threshold z, where z is deﬁned as the median value
of the Net Financial Account in the period between 1985 and 2002 per country.
• Crisis Inﬂow (crisis) : This is a indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the Net
Financial Account (IFS 78bjd) is below a threshold x, where x is the mean value minus
one standard deviation of the Net Financial Account over the period 1985 to 2002 for each
country.
• Stop in Capital Inﬂows (stop): This is a indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 for
negative changes in Net Capital Inﬂows.
• Sudden Stop: From Calvo et al. (2004). The authors deﬁne a Sudden Stop as a phase that
meets the following conditions:
1. It contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital ﬂows lies at
least two standard deviations below its sample mean.
2. The Sudden Stop phase ends once the annual change in capital ﬂows exceeds one standard
deviation below its sample mean.
3. Moreover, for the sake of symmetry, the start of a Sudden Stop phase is determined by
the ﬁrst time the annual change in capital ﬂows falls one standard deviation below the
mean.
4. The episode must lead to a costly disruption in economic activity, deﬁned as a contraction
in output.
For the episode section, we work with the ﬁrst year in the Calvo et al’s sudden-stop event.
47VII.B.3 Aggregate Investment
• We built aggregate investment data in our sample using the Capital Expenditures variable
described above. To control for the eﬀects of changes in sample size we aggregate annual
percentage changes in ﬁrm capital expenditure ˆ Iict, to construct the aggregate percentage





where αict−1 is the share of capital expenditures of ﬁrm i in total expenditures of country c
in period t − 1.
• Economy-wide investment data is Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation from the World
Economic Outlook of the IMF (IMF 2004b). For Korea and Indonesia, we complement the
IMF data with a series on private investment from Everhart and Sumlinski (2001).
• Both investment series are deﬂated by period average CPI from the International Financial
Statistics, (IMF, 2004a).
48Appendix Table 1: Robustness to Sample Changes
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables: Baseline Sample: Outliers z-score>6, synthetic firms, imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.015  0.075  0.052  0.004  -0.062  0.282  0.036  -0.039 
  Net Capital Account (0.093) (0.134) (0.026) ** (0.026) (0.346) (0.326) (0.064) (0.072)
Number of Observations 13943 11362 11613 9864 20023 20023 14238 11598
Sample 2: Outliers z-score>6, synthetic firms, no imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.015  0.075  0.050  0.004  -0.051  0.293  0.036  -0.039 
  Net Capital Account (0.093) (0.134) (0.026) * (0.026) (0.346) (0.326) (0.064) (0.072)
Number of Observations 13938 11362 11609 9864 20016 20016 14233 11598
Sample 3: Outliers z-score>6, no synthetic firms,  imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.018  0.078  0.056  0.008  0.057  0.432  0.047  -0.042 
  Net Capital Account (0.093) (0.134) (0.026) ** (0.026) (0.345) (0.326) (0.063) (0.072)
Number of Observations 14322 11666 11821 10041 20523 20523 14645 11922
Sample 4: Outliers z-score>6, no synthetic firms,  no imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x 0.018  0.078  0.054  0.008  0.068  0.442  0.047  -0.042 
  Net Capital Account (0.093) (0.134) (0.026) ** (0.026) (0.345) (0.325) (0.063) (0.072)
Number of Observations 14317 11666 11817 10041 20516 20516 14640 11922
Sample 5: Outliers top and bottom 1%, synthetic firms, imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.031  -0.032  0.055  0.004  -0.094  0.301  0.029  0.045 
  Net Capital Account (0.072) (0.084) (0.022) ** (0.024) (0.388) (0.360) (0.053) (0.057)
Number of Observations 13423 10964 11294 9599 19511 19511 13642 11072
Sample 6:  Outliers top and bottom 1%, synthetic firms, no imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.030  -0.032  0.054  0.004  -0.082  0.313  0.027  0.045 
  Net Capital Account (0.072) (0.084) (0.022) ** (0.024) (0.388) (0.360) (0.053) (0.057)
Number of Observations 13418 10964 11291 9599 19504 19504 13639 11072
Sample 7:  Outliers top and bottom 1%, no synthetic firms,  imputed values for bankrupt firms
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.025  -0.034  0.056  0.008  0.008  0.464  0.038  0.037 
  Net Capital Account (0.072) (0.084) (0.022) ** (0.024) (0.386) (0.359) (0.053) (0.057)
Number of Observations 13787 11261 11490 9764 19994 19994 14031 11386
Sample 8:  Outliers top and bottom 1%, no synthetic firms, no imputed values for bankrupt firms
 
Net Short-Term Exposure x -0.024  -0.034  0.056  0.008  0.021  0.476  0.036  0.037 
  Net Capital Account (0.072) (0.084) (0.022) ** (0.024) (0.386) (0.359) (0.053) (0.057)
Number of Observations 13782 11261 11487 9764 19987 19987 14028 11386
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets
Disposal of Fixed 
Assets>0
Notes: Each panel presents the results using a diﬀerent sample. Each cell reports the results of an OLS regression. The
dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the eﬀect of the indicated short-term exposure variable
times the capital inﬂow variable are listed in each cell. Independent variables in each regression are as in Table 3, Column 2,
however reporting of the rest of the estimates is supressed. A single asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% level
of conﬁdence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. Net capital account is from the current period, but normalized by lagged GDP. The
accounting data are from the Worldscope database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from various sources. For
detailed sources and descriptions, see Section II.
49